We study the impact of an agricultural microcredit program on the livelihoods of small, marginal, and landless tenant farmers in Bangladesh based on a Randomized Control Trial (RCT). Twenty percent of eligible households acquire at least one loan from the program within two years of the start of the intervention. Results show that access to credit has positive but imprecisely estimated effects on adoption of modern varieties (MV) of rice as well as rice yield. The microcredit program increases crop farm income but has no significant effect on total income or expenditure. Although the program does not have a significant effect on most economic outcomes, it demonstrates an increase in farm activities among the targeted farmers. Our study suggests that facilitating access to credit without addressing other constraints may not be enough to increase investment and profits of tenant farmers.
Access to credit facilitates the adoption of productivity-enhancing practices for creditconstrained farmers in developing countries. Credit-constrained farm households often cannot smooth consumption, resulting in suboptimal input allocation or risk-inefficient crop choices (Kumar, Turvey, and Kropp 2013) and low productivity (Ali, Deininger, and Duponchel 2014) . However, access to credit is not universal; each type of financial institution typically has a targeted client group (World Bank 2011) . Formal financial institutions (e.g., banks and cooperatives) are usually reluctant to lend to low-income households with inadequate collateral (Littlefield and Rosenberg 2004; Burgess and Pande 2005) . Rather, Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) typically lend to lowincome households (Gonzalez 2014 ) but they prioritize non-farm businesses over farming activities (Armend ariz and Labie 2011) . This phenomenon is more severe for farmers who own little land or rent land (henceforth referred to as tenant farmers) in developing countries (Hossain and Bayes 2009) .
In this study, we examine the impact of access to agricultural microcredit on the livelihood of tenant farmers in Bangladesh. The agricultural microcredit program is known as Borgachashi Unnayan Prakalpa (BCUP) and is administered by BRAC, one of the largest Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the world. The experiment was administered in 40 BRAC branches in rural Bangladesh evenly split between the treatment and control group. The dataset consists of a single baseline and a follow-up survey conducted in 2012 and 2014, respectively. The total sample consists of 4,301 farm households: 2,155 from the treatment group and 2,146 from the control group.
After two years of the BCUP intervention, 20% of eligible households in the treatment group acquired at least one loan from the BCUP program. The average loan amount for this group was BDT 31,100 ($400), which is approximately equal to the production cost of rice for one hectare of land.
1,2 To estimate the impact of the BCUP program, we apply the Intent-To-Treat (ITT) method to various outcome variables, including the adoption of rice (i.e., high yielding variety [HYV] and hybrid), rice yield (ton/hectare), and household income, along with other outcome variables. 3 We apply the Difference-In-Difference (DID) model to identify treatment effects. To account for the relatively small number of clusters in the data, we base statistical inference on the Wild-Cluster Bootstrap (WCB) and Randomization Inference (RI) method. We also use the Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) method to check the robustness of the DID-based impact estimates.
Our results show that the BCUP program increases the probability of adopting HYV and hybrid rice by 12 and 6 percentage points, respectively, in the Amon (monsoon rice crop) season. Treatment households are also 7 percentage points more likely to adopt hybrid rice in the Boro (irrigation-intensive dry season rice crop) season. We find that the BCUP intervention increases the yield rates of rice by 0.66 and 0.47 tons per hectare in the Amon and Boro seasons, respectively. These gains in rice yield rates are 53% and 15%, compared to the average yield rate in the Amon and Boro seasons, respectively, in the control group. We also find that the BCUP intervention increases crop farm income by BDT 4,700 ($59), decreases wage income by BDT 5, 132 ($64) , and has no significant effect on total income. Our results also show an imprecise positive effect on the cultivation of owned land and livestock ownership. The ANCOVA method shows no significant effects on the rate of MV rice adoption, Boro yield, and wage income, but it shows significant effects on land cultivation and time allocation in farm activities by children (ages 5-14), male (ages 15-64), and female (ages 15-64) members.
Results from quantile regression analysis show that increases in crop farm income are statistically significant and positive in all the quantiles of the crop farm income distribution, although impacts are proportionately larger in the upper tail of the distribution. In the case of rice yield, the impact of the BCUP program is concentrated in the upper quantiles of the yield rate distribution. Our findings are robust to alternative specifications; we show that the positive effects of the BCUP program on MV rice adoption, rice yield, and crop farm income are not driven by factors other than the BCUP loan (e.g., exposure to extension services). We use the Causal Forest (CF) method following Wager and Athey (2017) to estimate the heterogeneous treatment effect on the main outcome variables and find that the treatment effects are heterogeneously distributed.
Although several studies examine the role of agricultural credit on the livelihood of farm households, we examine the impact of a microcredit program designed specifically to increase the financial inclusion of tenant farmers. Previous literature on the role of agricultural credit is not conclusive. Beaman et al. (2014) find that access to loans increases investment in cultivation and agricultural output, but it has no significant effect on the net profit of farmers. A literature review by Gonzalez (2014) finds inconclusive results on the impact that agricultural loans have on the livelihood of farmers. There are also studies on the impact of general microcredit on business entrepreneurs. For example, Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015) review six studies on the impact of microfinance on the livelihood of small and medium business entrepreneurs and find that none of the interventions have a significant effect on household income or expenditures, albeit there are some transformative effects on the expansion of 1 $1¼BDT 80. 2 Average cost of rice production is BDT 38,800 for rice and BDT 29,000 for non-rice crop per one hectare of land (source: estimation from the survey data). 3 We consider all households from the random assignment in our analyses irrespective of their actual program participation. business activities. We find no overall positive impact of the BCUP intervention on household income or expenditures, but we notice a transformation in the economic activities of farm households to adopt MV rice and allocate more time in self-employment activities to increase their income in the crop farm sector. These findings, along with a low take-up rate, are also evident in the general microcredit literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we provide background and details of the BCUP program, followed by our experimental design, baseline survey and balance, endline survey and attrition, and regression framework. Next, we present results and a robustness check, followed by a discussion and conclusion.
Background of BCUP Intervention
About 70% of the total population of Bangladesh lives in rural areas where agriculture is the primary source of employment and income (Gautam and Faruqee 2016) . Tenant farmers who rent land make up a large part of the farming system. Over the last 25 years, the share of tenant farmers has increased from 44% to 58%, while their share of land operations has increased from 23% to 42% (Hossain and Bayes 2009 ). However, financial services for tenant farmers remained inadequate during the same period. The market share of formal financial institutions providing credit to farmers remained stagnant at around 16% to 32% (Faruqee 2010) . Hossain and Bayes (2009) show that only 1.5% of farmers who own less than 0.2 hectares of land have access to bank credit. Although the number of MFIs has increased over time, their role in crop agriculture has not increased proportionally. For instance, two leading MFIs in Bangladesh, Grameen and BRAC, disburse only 15% and 13%, respectively, of their total loans for farming (Faruqee 2010) . Therefore, access to credit for tenant farmers has remained a key challenge in rural areas of Bangladesh.
The BCUP Program
BRAC launched the BCUP program in 2009 with the financial support from the central bank of Bangladesh. The main objective of the BCUP program is to increase the credit access of tenant farmers to formal financial institutions. According to BRAC Microfinance administrative data, the BCUP program disbursed $8 billion in loans to about 700,000 farmers between its launch in 2009 and June 2018. BRAC follows a multi-stage selection process to ensure that credit goes to targeted farmers. In the first stage, farmers must meet the following eligibility criteria: national identification card ownership, age of 18 to 60 years, an area resident for at least three years, and landholdings below 200 decimals (less than one hectare). Furthermore, they must not hold a current membership with another MFI. In the second stage, program organizers (POs) visit the proposed investment sites of eligible applicants to ascertain whether the loan is for farming activities. After the initial screening stages, the branch manager and POs provide detailed information about the BCUP program's terms and conditions to eligible farmers. Once a farmer agrees to take a loan, (s)he is assigned to the nearest village organization (VO). A VO typically consists of four to eight teams of five farmers each from a village/community; the VO works as the primary platform for the discussion of loan utilization and collection of due installments.
The BCUP program offers several types of loans depending on farmers' needs and previous experience with loan utilization and repayment. The first loan for a new client from the BCUP program is typically for crop production ranges from BDT 5,000 ($63) to BDT 50,000 ($625). The program also offers a maximum of BDT 60,000 ($769) to rent land from others and a maximum of BDT 120,000 ($1,500) for purchasing machinery. In fact, BRAC's recent record shows that 71% of BCUP loans are for crop cultivation, and the remainder is for non-crop farming activities such as livestock, fishery, land lease, and machinery purchases. As our sample farm households lacked previous experience utilizing loans from the BCUP program, it was expected they would likely obtain crop production loans during our study period. The usual loan repayment period is one year with equal monthly installments. The farmers pay 19% interest on a reducing balance rate, which is lower than the 27% rate charged by other microfinance programs in Bangladesh. If a farmer fails to repay installments in due time, (s)he must pay additional interest on the remaining installments. The BCUP program had complementary extension services in the initial years when BRAC's agricultural development officers (ADO) provided information and advice on modern cultivation systems and farm management during the monthly VO meetings. However, BRAC stopped providing extension services in 2012 due to high attrition rates and recovery costs. Thus, our evaluation is limited to the impact of microcredit.
Experimental Design
We administered a cluster-randomized control trial experiment to evaluate the impact of the BCUP program. Forty BRAC branches were randomly chosen, with 20 assigned to the treatment group and 20 to the control group. For each branch, we randomly selected six villages for data collection within an eight-kilometer radius of the BCUP branch office, for a total of 240 villages. We conducted a household-level census to identify eligible households in all 240 villages (See Malek et al. 2015 for details), (Hossain et al. 2016) . The census covered 61,322 households, among which 7,563 households fulfilled the eligibility criteria and were willing to accept an agricultural loan. We randomly selected 4,301 households from the eligible household list as our study sample. We present similarities between the selected and non-selected eligible households in online supplementary material, table A1. Results show that both groups are statistically similar in all eligibility criteria used to select the sample for this study. The mean difference between the two groups is significant for only 1 (cultivated land) of 10 variables at the 10% significance level.
Once the baseline survey was completed, we randomly selected 20 BCUP branches for the treatment group and 20 for the control group. The final sample includes 2,155 households in the treatment group and 2,146 households in the control group. We also collected time allocation information from a subsample of 1,607 households. Contamination between the treatment and control branches of BCUP is unlikely because each branch is located in a different sub-district and each sub-district is a separate government administrative unit with a well-known geographical boundary. We present the locations of the treatment and the control branches in online supplementary material, figure A1 which shows that only a few treatment and control branches are located next to each other. Because the BCUP program administration was aware of the status of each branch in the study, it was unlikely that the POs would disburse loans in a control branch.
One important feature of the BCUP program is that the loan applicant cannot be a member of any other MFI during the selection period. Therefore, the sample of this study is different from existing microfinance members. From our census data, we find that 43% of the households have at least one member with microfinance involvement. We present a comparison of household characteristics by microfinance membership in online supplementary material, table A2. Results show that households with microfinance membership have a larger household size and are better educated, on average. Microfinance households have less cultivated land and rent more land from other households compared to non-microfinance households.
After the baseline survey, we gave the list of treatment branches to the BRAC-BCUP administration, which launched the BCUP program in the listed branches. The POs visited every village to locate borrowers following the same criteria mentioned in the previous section. We did not provide information on our study sample to the BCUP program but expected the BCUP program to select our sample households eligible for loans.
Baseline Survey and Balance
We conducted the baseline survey in JulyAugust 2012 to collect detailed information on household demographics, asset holdings, expenditures, farming systems, engagement in economic activities, and income. We expect no systematic differences between the treatment and control groups at the baseline because treatment status was randomly assigned. Table 1 shows a statistical comparison between the treatment and control groups. We present the baseline mean for the control and treatment groups in columns 1 and 2, respectively, and the mean differences in column 3. In addition to absolute mean differences, we also present the normalized difference 4 between the two groups for each variable in column 4. The normalized difference is used to assess the similarity in the covariates' distributions (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009) . The significance level of the mean differences (pvalue) is presented in column 5.
Results show that the treatment and control groups are well balanced for most of the covariates. The mean differences between the treatment and control groups are different for 2 out of 37 variables at the 10% significance level. Results also show that all normalized differences are less than 0.15. An important point to note is that for some of Note: Number of households are 2,155 and 2,146 in treatment and control groups, respectively. Standard errors of differences are clustered at the branch level. Normalized difference in column 4 is computed as the difference in means in treatment and control villages, divided by the square root of the sum of the variances in column 6. The P-value in column 5 is for the mean difference test between the treatment and control groups.
the outcome variables, although the mean differences are not statistically significant even at the 10% significance level, we notice the differences are large (e.g., farm and non-farm business incomes, number of goats, etc.). In the regression framework section, we discuss in detail how our estimation strategy accounts for differences in baseline characteristics. From the baseline data, we find that 7% of the control group and 5% of the treatment group have an NGO membership before the survey, which occurred because sample households misreported their microfinance membership during the census. We expect this is not a large enough percentage to change the interpretation of the impact estimates. Nevertheless, we estimate program impacts excluding these households as a robustness check.
We can also examine the overall characteristics of our sample from table 1. Average household size is five persons, with a male member (94%) heading most of the sample households. Household heads are typically less educated, with only three years of formal education on average. Sample households also belong to the lower tail of the distribution of land and have limited ownership of cultivable land (0.15 hectare). The smaller amount of landholdings implies that some households may resort to the rental market to increase the size of their operational land. Our baseline data show that around 64% of the households are either purely tenant farmers or mixed tenant farmers who cultivate both owned and rented land.
End-Line Survey and Attrition
We conducted the follow-up survey in JulyAugust 2014, two years after the baseline survey. We successfully re-interviewed about 96% of the respondents. The attrition rate was similar between the treatment and control groups: 3.9% in the treatment group and 3.6% in the control group. A small percentage of attrition is expected because an eligibility condition of this study requires permanent residency in the village.
We also test whether the attrition rate is related to any observed characteristics. Online supplementary material, table A3 shows the regression results for our tests of differential attrition rates. We find that household treatment status is not significantly related to attrition rate in any regression specifications. We include observable characteristics in column 2 and find that only the household head's education level has a significant relationship with the attrition rate at the 10% significance level. In column 3, we additionally control for the interaction of treatment status and observable characteristics and find that only the interactions of household size and landholdings with the treatment status are statistically significant. As we do not find any consistent pattern in the relationship between attrition rate and observable characteristics, we conclude that the attrition rate is unlikely to bias our impact estimates. The remainder of our analysis is based on the 4,141 balanced panel households-2,072 from the treatment group and 2,069 from the control group. For the time allocation analysis, we use the balanced panel data of 1,236 households. By the end of two years of our study, BRAC disbursed loans in 16 out of 20 initial treatment branches. In four treatment branches, BRAC did not initiate the BCUP program due to administrative reasons, coupled with insufficient demand to run a new branch in some instances.
Regression Framework
We use the Intention-To-Treat (ITT) method that compares the average outcomes of the treatment and control groups to estimate the impact of BCUP intervention on the outcome variables. ITT estimates are based on initial treatment assignment irrespective of households' actual participation in the program. Because we find that some of our outcome variables are not perfectly balanced, we estimate the program impacts, adjusting for baseline covariates. We use the DifferenceIn-Difference (DID) model in the estimation. Consider the following regression model:
where Y it is an outcome for household i at time t, T i is a dummy variable indicating the treatment status, W t is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation is from 2014, and 0 otherwise, X i0 is a vector of the baseline covariates, and e it is an idiosyncratic error. We control the district-level fixed effects (g d ) to improve the efficiency of the estimates (Bruhn and McKenzie 2009 We cluster all standard errors at the branch level to account for intra-cluster correlation. Although the clustered standard error is widely used, it has limitations as its biasedness depends on the number of branches instead of the number of households. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) propose a wild bootstrap procedure when the number of clusters is not too small. Therefore, we reestimate the standard errors based on the Wild Cluster Bootstrap (WCB) procedure following Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) . The WCB estimates the error term from equation (1) and creates bootstrap datasets to estimate the distribution ofb. MacKinnon and Webb (2016) show that different versions of WCB can also over-reject or under-reject a hypothesis, and find that the Randomization Inference (RI) does a better job in small numbers of clusters. RI is a permutation-based method used to examine whether the treatment effect estimated in equation (1) is observed by chance. RI estimates the distribution ofb using the alternative combinations of treatment assignment. It is important to note that RI tests a sharp null hypothesis of the zero-treatment effect on individual households, whereas the DID model tests a null hypothesis of the zero-average treatment effect. In other words, our two chosen methods of inference complement one another. WCB checks whether our conclusions are robust while allowing individual treatment effects to vary. RI checks whether our conclusions are robust while relying solely on the randomization, without any distributional assumptions about test statistics Heß (2017) . Online supplementary material, appendices B and C detail all the steps followed in the estimation of wild cluster bootstrap and RI, respectively.
The ANCOVA (or lagged dependent variable model) is another alternative model used to estimate the causal effect of BCUP intervention adjusted for baseline difference. McKenzie (2012) suggests that with a single baseline and follow-up survey, the ratio of variances of DID and ANCOVA estimators is 2=ð1 þ qÞ, where q is the autocorrelation between the baseline and follow-up information. The author mentions that although estimating DID is a common practice in many experimental studies, the ANCOVA estimator is preferable in terms of gaining more power in estimation. We determine the ANCOVA estimator using the following equation:
where the notations are the same as in equation (1), Y ipost and Y iPRE are end-line and baseline values of an outcome variable, respectively, and b 2 is the ANCOVA estimator. Results based on WCB and RI show that the BCUP program increases participation and the loan amount like the DID model. However, results from the ANCOVA model show that the BCUP intervention increases the probability of acquiring a loan from banks and Grameen, and reduces the probability of taking a loan from other NGOs, although these coefficients are quite small. During the follow-up survey, we collected self-reported loan utilization information from respondents; participant households spent around 43% of the total loan on crop cultivation, followed by 14% in livestock, poultry, and fisheries. Households also used 13.4% of the total BCUP loan for investment in non-farm business activities. Farmers used a small portion of the BCUP loan in other activities, such as repaying earlier debts (6.7%) and house repairs (5.9%). Around 35% of the participant households reported that they repaid loans from self-employment activities, and 55% reported that they repaid loans from wage, service, or remittance income.
Results

Access to Credit
Modern Variety (MV) Rice Adoption and Rice Yield
Rice comprises 75% of both total crop production and cultivated areas in Bangladesh (Talukder and Chile 2014) . Thus, MV rice adoption and rice yield rate are the main outcomes of interest in this study. There are three rice seasons in Bangladesh: Aus, Amon, and Boro.
5 The importance of the Aus season has declined substantially with the availability of MV rice and improvements in irrigation facilities over time. For this study, we estimated the impact of the BCUP program on the yield rate and adoption of HYV and hybrid rice in the Amon and Boro seasons.
Results are presented in table 3. Panel A shows the impact on the adoption of MV rice in the Amon and Boro seasons. We find that treatment households are 12 percentage points more likely to adopt HYV rice and 6 percentage points more likely to adopt hybrid rice in the Amon season, and 8 percentage points more likely to adopt hybrid rice in the Boro season. Results from WCB and RI also confirm findings of the DID model. We present RI results in the online supplementary material, figure A2 . The impact on HYV adoption in the Amon season is 46% of the average adoption rate in the control group. The impact on hybrid rice adoption in the Amon and Boro seasons is more than 100% compared to the mean adoption rate in the control area, but it is important to note that the mean adoption rate is very low during the same time. In fact, our results from the ANCOVA model show that the BCUP intervention has no significant effect on MV rice adoption and the coefficient of HYV in the Boro season is negative and significant at 10% significance Note: N¼8,282 in all specifications except for the ANCOVA model, which consists of 4,141 observations. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1-5 report the probability of having one loan from the respective source in the last year. The corresponding columns in panel B report the credit amount. "Informal lender" includes moneylenders and friends/family. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple (***) denote variable significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The RI-b P* test sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect on any observations. Wild cluster p-value and RI-b P are estimated based on 5,000 replications. District-level fixed effects are included in all columns. Baseline control set includes number of age-dependent members [age <15 or age >64], the number of working-age family members [ages 15 to 64], household head's sex, education and age, and the amount of land, cows, and goats owned.
5 Aus is the pre-monsoon rice cultivation season, in which rice is seeded April-May and harvested July-August. Amon is the rain-fed monsoon production period, in which rice is seeded April-May and harvested November-December. Finally, Boro is the irrigation intensive dry-season rice production period, in which rice is seeded December-February and harvested AprilMay. Rice was mainly local and HYV varieties until early 2000, when hybrid rice was introduced in Bangladesh. Hybrid rice, a type of rice bred from two very different parents, can significantly out-yield other rice varieties. The main differences between HYV and hybrid rice is that farmers cannot save seeds of the hybrid variety for future cultivation, and hybrid rice cultivation is highly irrigation intensive. level. Thus, the impact on MV rice adoption is inconclusive.
Panel B shows the impact of the BCUP program on yield rates in the Amon and Boro seasons along with the aggregate yield rate. We find that the BCUP intervention increases yield rates by 0.66 and 0.47 tons per hectare in the Amon and Boro seasons, respectively, and 0.50 tons per hectare in the total. Compared to the mean of the control group at the same time, yield rates increased 53% in the Amon season and 15% in the Boro season. ANCOVA results show that only the impact on yield rate in the Amon season is significant and is approximately 46% of the mean yield rate in the control group.
The quantile regression based on the DID model showing the distribution of impact on yields for both the Amon and Boro seasons are presented in figure 1. There is very little or no difference in yields between the treatment and control groups until the 70th percentile, which indicates that most of the impact belongs to the upper tail of the distributions of yields in both seasons. Overall, we do not incur a precise impact on adoption and yield rate except for the Amon season.
Income and Expenditures
We examine the impact of the BCUP program on income and expenditures because both indicators reflect household welfare. Results are presented in table 4. Panel A shows the impact on household income from different sources and panel B shows the impact on expenditures. We find that the BCUP intervention increases crop farm income by BDT 4,700 ($59) and decreases wage income by BDT 5,132 ($64) in the treatment group compared to the control group. The impact is positive for business income, although it is not statistically significant. There is no impact on total income.
As before, the WCB and RI tests confirm the results of the DID model. From the results using the ANCOVA model, we find that the BCUP intervention increases crop farm income by BDT 4,900 ($61), but it has no significant effect on wage income. If we compare the average income level of the Note: N¼8,282 in all specifications except for the ANCOVA model that consists of 4,141 observations. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Adoption indicator is estimated based on whether a household adopts that category of rice seed in any plots in that season. Aggregate yield in column 4 in panel B is calculated as total production divided by total land cultivated in the Amon and Boro rice seasons. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple (***) denote any variable significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The RI-b P* test sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect on any observations. Wild cluster p-value and RI-b P are estimated based on 5,000 replications. District-level fixed effects are included in all columns. Baseline control set includes number of age-dependent members (age <15 or age >64), the number of working-age family members (ages 15 to 64), household head's sex, education and age, and the amount of land, cows, and goats owned.
control group at the follow-up round to the DID estimates, we find that crop farm income gain is 27% in the treatment group (95% confidence interval ranges from 4% to 48%), which is quite higher than one can expect given the low take-up rate of the BCUP loan. Figure 1 shows the distributions of the impact on farm and wage income using quantile regression analysis. We find that the gain in crop farm income is significantly positive for its entire distribution, but it is proportionally larger in the upper quantiles. On the other hand, the impact on wage income is significantly negative only around the 40th to 70th quantiles. There are no significant differences between the treatment and control groups in the lower tail of the wage income distribution, and the point estimates are approximately zero. Panel B shows the effect of the BCUP intervention on household food, non-food, and total expenditures. We find no significant effect on any expenditure indicators.
Labor Supply
As most of the farmers in our study are marginal and landless, it would not be surprising if some farmers work additional hours to increase profits in the presence of additional working capital after participating in the BCUP program. At the same time, additional capital can also affect the number of working hours for the other members of a household. From our findings in the previous section, we notice an increase in crop farm income in the treatment group, which could cause the number of working hours in self-employment activities to increase as well. Table 5 presents the impact of the BCUP program on the time allocation of household members by age and sex. We show results for four household groups: children (ages 5-14), males (ages 15-64), females (ages 15-64), and seniors (over age 64). Results from the DID model show that the BCUP program has no significant effect on time allocation except that women and older-age members spend more time in household activities. On the other hand, ANCOVA results show that children and working-age male and female members work more hours in farm activities after the BCUP intervention. We also find that working-age male members reduce time allocation in non-farm and household activities, whereas we find again that older-age members increase time allocation in household activities.
Landholding and Livestock Assets
One of the major objectives of the BCUP program is increasing the farm activities of credit-constrained farmers. If the BCUP program relaxes credit constraints, we would expect that farmers will engage more in farm activities and, hence, their land cultivation will also increase. The BCUP program can also increase the productive asset holdings of participant farmers as a livelihood diversification strategy; productive assets can work as Note: N¼8,282 in all specifications except for the ANCOVA model, which consists of 4,141 observations. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All values show yearly BDT amount. Asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) denote variable significance at 10%, and 5% respectively. The RI-b P* test sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect on any observations. Wild cluster p-value and RI-b P are estimated based on 5,000 replications. District-level fixed effects are included in all columns. Baseline control set includes number of age-dependent members (age <15 or age >64), the number of working-age family members (ages 15 to 64), household head's sex, education and age, and the amount of land, cows, and goats owned.
buffer stocks in case of financial difficulties or crop failures. In this section, we examine whether BCUP loans increase household access to land and livestock assets (e.g., cows and goats).
Results are presented in table 6. We do not find any significant effect of the BCUP program on land cultivation, although the point estimates for owned and rented-in land are considerably large. We find the BCUP participants own significantly more cows and goats compared to the control group. Once again, WCB and RI methods confirm the findings of the DID model. From the Note: N¼2,472 in all specifications except for the ANCOVA model, which consists of 1,236 observations. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All values show hours daily. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple (***) denote variable significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. RI-b P* test sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect on any observations. Wild cluster p-value and RI-b P are estimated based on 5,000 replications. District-level fixed effects are included in all columns. Baseline control set includes number of age-dependent members (age <15 or age >64) the number of working-age family members (ages 15 to 64), household head's sex, education and age, and the amount of land, cow, and goat owned. Table 6 . Impact on Access to Land and Asset Holdings
Own cultivation (decimals)
Rented-in (decimals)
Rented-out (decimals) Note: N ¼ 8,282 in all specifications except for the ANCOVA model, which consists of 4,141 observations. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1-3 show land amount in decimals and columns 4-6 show number of respective assets. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple (***) denote variable significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. RI-b P* test sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect on any observations. Wild cluster p-value and RI-b P are estimated based on 5,000 replications. District-level fixed effects are included in all columns. Baseline control set includes number of age-dependent members (age <15 or age >64), the number of working-age family members (ages 15 to 64), household head's sex, education and age, and the amount of land, cows, and goats owned.
ANCOVA model, we find that the BCUP program significantly increases owned land cultivation by 30% compared to the control group. BCUP intervention also reduces renting out land to other households and increases cow holdings compared to the control group.
Input Expenditure and Market Sales of Rice
Our final outcomes regard household input expenditures on rice, non-rice crop farm, and business activities. Results are presented in panel A of table 7. We do not find any significant effect of the BCUP program on these variables. All point estimates are positive and quite large, especially for business activities. The lack of a significant effect on input expenditures in farm activities could be the timing of the loan from the BCUP program. If a farmer uses loan money mostly during the first year of the BCUP intervention, we might not see any change in the input expenditures when we conduct the follow-up survey two years later.
Panel B explores whether credit access increases farmers' waiting time to sell their products until they can get a desirable price. This is a critical issue because many farmers acquire loans from informal sources to cover production costs and must sell their products immediately after harvesting at a lower price to repay the loan. We expect that the BCUP credit access relaxes this constraint and allows tenant farmers to wait for desirable prices to sell their crops. Our results show no significant changes between selling within 1 month of harvesting and selling in the next 11 months, although point estimates are positive for sales in the last 11 months and negative for sales within 1 month.
Robustness Checks
We find that sign and significance level of the impact estimates vary with the use of DID and ANCOVA models for some outcome variables. In online supplementary material, tables A6-A11, we show results of both DID and ANCOVA models where we control only baseline covariates (without controlling for district-level fixed effects). We find that both DID and ANCOVA models generate similar results for most of the outcome variables except for income indicators. As we mention in the previous section, gain in crop farm income is quite higher than one can expect and most of the income estimates are not consistent over different specifications, which casts doubt on their significance level if any. We perform additional robustness checks of our impact estimates in three ways. First, we estimate the impact of the BCUP program by dropping households that had MFI memberships at the baseline. As mentioned previously, 6% of our sample was MFI members, having misreported microfinance membership during the census. Second, we winsorize values of continuous outcome variables above the 95th percentile with the value at the 95th percentile to reduce the sensitivity of the treatment effect by extreme values. Third, one concern in our estimates is whether MV rice adoption and rice yield rate are driven by factors other than microcredit (e.g., extension services). We re-estimate program impacts controlling for access to extension services from other agents (e.g., government extension officers). The extension indicator is an additional control in equation (1).
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We present robustness results in online supplementary material, table A12 for three main sets of outcome variables: adoption rates, yield, and income. Column 1 shows impact estimates from our earlier results using the DID model. When we drop households with MFI membership during the baseline survey, coefficients of MV rice adoption and rice yield rate remain similar, but the coefficients of crop farm income decrease whereas wage income increases, which implies that pre-MFI treatment households gain more in crop farm activities from the BCUP credit program participation. After winsorizing the top 5% extreme values, we find that the impact estimates become consistently smaller, and the impact on income from other sources becomes negative and significant. Finally, we find that exposure to extension services from other sources does not alter program estimates significantly.
Heterogeneous Treatment Effect
The heterogeneous treatment effect is often a point of interest to policymakers and other stakeholders alongside the simple average treatment effect. The most common strategy in heterogeneity analysis is to use the subgroup analysis in which the treatment effects are estimated for each group (e.g., by age or sex of participants). One potential problem with the subgroup analysis is that researchers may intentionally choose subgroups with higher treatment effects or report only extreme effects (Assmann et al. 2000; Cook, Gebski, and Keech 2004) . Moreover, choosing a large number of subgroups can generate overfitting in the model (Chernozhukov et al. 2018) . Non-parametric methods (e.g., nearest-neighbor matching, kernel methods, or series estimation) work well with a small number of covariates, but those can break down as the number of variables increase (Wager and Athey 2017). To overcome these shortcomings, a growing number of studies are using machine learning (ML) tools to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. ML methods are ideal for estimating treatment heterogeneity when a large number of baseline covariates are available, and researchers have limited guidance on which variables are relevant (Chernozhukov et al. 2017) .
We estimate treatment heterogeneity using the causal forest (CF) method following Wager and Athey (2017), which is based on an ensemble of causal trees. Causal trees predict the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) for a subgroup such that x 2 R k using the average difference between treatment and control outcomes as follows:
where W 2 ð0; 1Þ showing control or treatment status of households, R k ðWÞ is the observation set i such that X i 2 R k , and N k ðWÞ 6 During the baseline and follow-up surveys, we ask households if they have met an extension worker in their community or elsewhere in the previous year. These two variables are exogenous to BCUP intervention. We check whether BCUP intervention has any effect on these two variables and find no significant effect (results are not presented here). Therefore, these two variables are not post-treatment variables and we can control for them in equation (1).
is the corresponding number of observations. Each causal tree is grown using a binary splitting rule that chooses a feature and cutoff yielding a maximum value of P i2R kŝ ðX i Þ 2 that also maximizes the variance of predicted treatment effects,ŝðX i Þ.
In online supplementary material, table A12, we present heterogeneous treatment effects for three main sets of outcome variables: MV rice adoption, rice yield, and income. Column 1 in online supplementary material, table A12, shows the mean of the estimated heterogeneous treatment effect, while column 3 shows the median effect. Columns 4 and 5 present the minimum and maximum treatment effects, respectively. We find that mean treatment effects using the CF method on MV rice adoption and rice yield rate are very similar to ATE estimates by non-ML methods. The mean treatment estimate of crop farm income is about half the non-ML ATE estimate, and the ATE of wage income is very small. In online supplementary material, figures A3a,b-A5, we show histograms of heterogeneous treatment effects for all variables considered here. It is evident from the histograms that a substantial heterogeneity in treatment effect exists for all variables, although treatment effects are mostly positively distributed.
Discussion and Conclusion
We estimate the impact of an agricultural microcredit program intended to increase the credit access of tenant farmers in Bangladesh. Two years after the BCUP program was launched in the treatment area, we find that 20% of eligible farmers acquired at least one loan from the BCUP program and invested about 57% of their total loans in agricultural activities such as crop cultivation and the livestock, poultry, and fishery sectors. We also find that the BCUP program increased MV rice adoption, rice yield rate, and crop farm income, although imprecisely in some cases. We do not find any significant impact on household total income or total expenditures. Our results show some imprecise positive impacts on increased land cultivation, working hours in farm activities, and livestock holdings. Similar to the literature on general microcredit, we conclude that the BCUP program has a transformative effect on the livelihood of tenant farmers in Bangladesh but does not have a significant impact on their overall welfare.
The take-up rate of the BCUP program is only 20%, which is very similar to the take-up rate in general microcredit-related studies. Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015) show that participation rates range from 17% to 31% in six microfinance studies. Participation rates vary by region, for example, 12.7% in India , 10% in Morocco (Crepon et al. 2015) , 10% in Mexico (Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2015) , and 36% in Ethiopia (Tarozzi, Desai, and Johnson 2015) . We explore determinants of participation in the BCUP program to examine who acquired loans. We use the mean difference test and logit regression model to check whether loan participants and nonparticipants hold distinct characteristics. Results are presented in online supplementary material, tables A4 and A5, respectively. Our results show younger household heads are more likely to participate in the BCUP loan program. Additional wage income and business income increase the probability of loan participation, but more livestock holdings and better household infrastructure (e.g., access to sanitary latrine) reduce participation in the BCUP program.
One important finding of our study is that credit access increases household crop farm income but reduces wage income, which accounts for an insignificant effect on total income. This finding is not surprising given other studies with similar findings. Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015) find no statistically significant effect on household income in any of the six studies reviewed but mention that two studies report a positive business income accompanied by a reduction in wage income. Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015) address such a transformation by microfinance as a positive sign because it provides more freedom in choices and self-reliance for participant households. The impact of the BCUP program on MV rice adoption, rice yield rate, and time allocation can explain our findings of positive crop farm income. We show that the BCUP program has a significant positive effect on MV rice adoption and rice yield rates, and it also helps workingage household members spend more time on farm activities. The impact of microcredit on productivity is evident in other studies. For example, positive effects on productivity are found by Ayaz and Hussain (2011) in Pakistan and Girabi and Mwakaje (2013) in Tanzania. Similarly, positive effects on time allocation are evident in studies by Attanasio et al. (2015) in Mongolia and in India. Our results can be interpreted as follows: an increase in MV rice adoption along with higher time allocation raises production, which increases household income in the crop farm sector.
Insignificant effects of the BCUP program on the overall welfare of farmers have implications for future policies toward their financial inclusion. Foltz (2004) states that better access to the agricultural credit market may increase profits of rich farmers compared to poor farmers; he also states that the low-profit elasticity of credit (0.20) casts doubt on improving credit access in the agricultural sector. Beaman et al. (2014) find a similar result in a field experiment in Mali. Earlier literature indicates that credit may not be the only constraint for farmers. For example, Karlan et al. (2014) show that when cash grants are combined with insurance, farmers are more likely to invest in more risky crops. de Janvry et al. (2016) state that farmers are likely to utilize credit services when superior technology is available along with credit availability, such as flood-tolerant rice in India (Emerick et al. 2016 ) and contractual arrangements to produce high-value export crops in Kenya (Ashraf, Gin e, and Karlan 2009 ). Other interventions or market improvements may be needed alongside microcredit for the latter to improve farmer welfare.
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